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CLICK HERE TO SHARE! THE IMPACT OF THE VEOH
LITIGATIONS ON VIACOM V. YOUTUBE
Phong Dinh'
In the high-bandwidth Internet age, video sharing websites
such as YouTube and Yahoo! Video are growing in popularity.
The ease with which such sharing is accomplished has aided users
in illegally uploading copyrighted movies, TV shows, and music.
In a recent lawsuit, Viacom and its copyright-owning affiliates
sought one billion dollars in damages against YouTube, one of the
Web's most popular video-sharing websites, for copyright
infringement. In response, YouTube invoked the affirmative
defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor
provisions, codified at § 512. The Act states that a service
provider is not liable for hosting copyrighted information on its
own system for a prolonged period of time as long the service
provider has met the threshold requirements for these provisions
and the specific requirements for at least one of the four safe
harbors.
Before California district courts' holdings in lo Group, Inc. v.
Veoh Networks, Inc. and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., no court had examined the safe harbor defense as
applied to video sharing websites. The success of this defense is
now more certain after these recent holdings, which employed law
consistent with prior applications of the safe harbor provisions. If
the District Court for the Southern District ofNew York applies the
Veoh reasoning, which provides similarly situated video-sharing
websites a viable defense, the Court should find YouTube freefrom
liability through the safe harbor provision codified at § 512(c).
Despite Viacom's arguments in its amended complaints, these
recent cases indicate that YouTube likely meets the threshold
requirements of the safe harbor provisions. Furthermore, these
cases indicate that YouTube specifically falls under the umbrella of
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
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§ 512(c) protection because it hosts copyrighted information on its
system as "storage under the direction of the users." Thus, the
Veoh cases strongly suggest that YouTube should succeed in
asserting the affirmative safe harbor defense.
A holding in favor of YouTube will correctly guide
developments in copyright law toward a more efficient burden-
sharing system. It would also support the goals of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act by protecting the rights of copyright
holders, service providers, and end users.
I. INTRODUCTION
From a video of a dancing dog to a video of a talking toddler,
video sharing is the new pen and paper. It is the new instant
message, the way people share information and tell stories. These
are the scenes repeated thousands of times a day: high-school
students gathered around a computer before class, professionals
bored at work in front of their computers, grandmas and grandpas
sitting in front of their laptops. People of all ages are using the
Internet to share a funny moment, an unforgettable scene, or to
simply say hello to loved ones. This high-tech sharing is possible
because of Internet service providers like YouTube, Yahoo! Video,
and Veoh.2
Though the intended use of these websites is to show
homemade videos and amateur films,3 some users are taking
advantage of these sites to share copyrighted forms of media, such
as movies and television shows.' In response, copyright owners
2 Yahoo! Video also provides services similar to YouTube and Veoh by
allowing users to upload their own videos and share it with other users. About
Yahoo! Video, http://www.yvideoblog.com/blog/about/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
3 See infra notes 26-3 1.
4 As the plaintiffs pointed out in their complaint, examples include the
television shows "SpongeBob SquarePants," "The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart," "The Colbert Report," "South Park," "Ren & Stimpy," and "MTV
Unplugged," and the movies "An Inconvenient Truth," and "Mean Girls." See
First Amended Complaint, infra note 14, at 2. As of Mar. 7, 2009, an example
of a clip of the Colbert Report can be found at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-heKKBgEbtx8.
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have fought feverishly to protect their rights, resulting in an
increase in copyright infringement lawsuits over the last few
years.' With copyright lawsuits being filed frequently, courts are
constantly presented with the opportunity to shift the law in a way
that imposes on service providers a heightened duty to protect
copyright owners' intellectual property. When such a shift is
imposed on large sites with millions of videos, this heightened
duty may be too burdensome and may force providers to limit their
services or shut down completely.
Copyright law attempts to balance consumers' rights and
freedom of information with the constitutional Founders' desire to
protect copyrighted work.' The goal of copyright has always been
to foster further innovation.' This means balancing the interests of
three important groups: copyright owners, service providers, and
consumers.! The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")9
See Posting of Kurt Hunt to Michigan Telecommunications and Technology
Law Review Blog, http://blog.mttlr.org/2007/1 1/timeline-of-youtube-litigation
.html (listing several recent YouTube decisions including: Premier League v.
YouTube, No. 1:07-cv-03582-UA (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007); Grisman v.
YouTube, No. 3:2007-cv-02518 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007); New Jersey
Turnpike Authority v. YouTube, No. 2:2007-cv-02414 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007);
Cal IV v. YouTube, No. 3:2007-cv-00617 (M.D. Tenn. June 7, 2007)) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); see also Martha L. Arias, Internet Law-Video-Sharing: May
This New Internet Phenomenon Violate Copyrights?, INTERNET BUSINESS LAW
SERVICES (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.ibls.com/internetlaw newsportal view
.aspx?s=latestnews&id=1693 (listing several lawsuits, including Universal suing
Bolt.com) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
6 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.3 (2001) ("Congress'
adjustment of the author/publisher balance is a permissible expression of the
'economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause],' i.e., 'the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort [motivated] by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare."') (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
7Id.
8 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984). ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has
been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should
be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of
SPRING 2009] 449
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was enacted in 1998 in an attempt to balance the rights of each
group in this digital age.o While the Act created ways for
copyright owners to enforce their rights on the Internet, it also
limited such rights." For instance, the DMCA's safe harbor
provisions serve to limit enforcement rights of copyright owners
and grant service providers some leeway.12 This, in turn, allows
consumers to produce new creative works and to maximize
creative innovation.13
Consumers and service providers, however, are at great risk for
having their rights and interests severely limited. In this recent
lawsuit seeking damages of one billion dollars, Viacom and its
affiliates-the owners of thousands of copyrighted movies,
television shows and songs-sued YouTube, Inc. in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 4 Viacom alleges
YouTube committed willful copyright infringement by allowing
users to share copyrighted videos." YouTube's principal defense
their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest
in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our
patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.").
Id.
9 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
to See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
" See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir.
2007) (stating that the DMCA "limits the liability of a service provider 'for
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to
an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or
hypertext link' if the service provider meets certain criteria.") (quoting the
DMCA, 17 U.S.C. 512(d)).
12 See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. See also Perfect 10, 508
F.3d at 1175.
" MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932-933 (2005) ("[T]he
doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial
lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute
fault than the mere understanding that some of one's products will be misused.
It leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.").
14 See First Amended Complaint, Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-
2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2008 filed Apr. 24, 2008).
" See id.
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is the DMCA's safe harbor provisions." These provisions protect
service providers, such as YouTube, from infringement claims
when they simply provide a file-sharing database." Currently, the
parties are in discovery. If YouTube is successful in asserting its
protection under the safe harbor, then Viacom can only receive
injunctive relief'" Consequently, Viacom would not be able to
recover any of the one billion dollars in alleged damages.19 The
outcome of this case is not only important because YouTube is the
most popular video-sharing website on the Internet,2 0 but also
because the outcome of this case may indicate the publishing
companies' likelihood of success in future litigation against video-
sharing websites. Most importantly, this decision will help
determine the breadth and power of the DMCA's safe harbor
provisions.
Until recently, various courts interpreted the safe harbor
provisions with divergent holdings; these variations made it
difficult to predict Viacom's probability of succeeding.2' Cases
16 See Answer to First Amended Complaint, Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., No. 07-2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2008 filed May 23, 2008).
1 See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
8 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1) (2006) ("A service provider shall not be liable for
monetary relief").
19 Id.
20 Press Release, comScore.com, YouTube Surpasses 100 Million U.S.
Viewers for the First Time, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.comscore.com/press/
release.asp?press=2741 ("Google Sites once again ranked as the top U.S. video
property with 6.4 billion videos viewed (43 percent online video market share),
with YouTube.com accounting for more than []99 percent of all videos viewed
at the property.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
21 Some courts protected a file sharing service provider through the DMCA's
provision. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBilI LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the service providers that provide links to websites containing
copyrighted materials qualified for DMCA safe harbor provisions because the
service provider acted in good faith where there were lack of adequate DMCA
infringement notices). However, some courts limited such protection and
imposed liability upon the service provider despite the DMCA provisions. See
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Communities, Inc, 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the newsgroup and file-sharing service provider did not qualify for
safe harbor because adequate notice was given and service provider did not
comply). Until Veoh, no case had circumstances similar to those of YouTube.
SPRING 2009] 451
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from the district courts of California, in particular Io Group, Inc. v.
Veoh Networks, Inc. 22 and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc.,23 indicate a shift in the law toward an interpretation
of the DMCA's safe harbor provision that will enhance protection
for video-sharing service providers.2 4 These holdings are the first
steps toward a copyright system that will be able to more
efficiently balance the competing interests of the copyright owner,
service provider, and consumer. Though the Io Group and UMG
decisions are not controlling in the Southern District of New York,
they provide persuasive reasoning given the striking similarities
between the two service providers, Veoh and YouTube. If the
YouTube court follows the reasoning behind the Io Group and
UMG decisions, then it should find that YouTube qualifies for the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions. Additionally, a decision in favor
of YouTube would further the legislative goals of the DMCA and
would effectively allocate burdens between service providers and
copyright holders.
Part I of this Recent Development examines the structure of the
Veoh website and explores the basic facts behind the Veoh
litigation. Part II looks at the DMCA, its safe harbor provisions,
and the application of each in the Veoh holdings. This Part also
analyzes the courts' conclusions of law and prior applications of
the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. Part III describes the
similarities between the YouTube and Veoh websites as well as the
ensuing litigation with Viacom. In Part IV, this Recent
Development considers the DMCA safe harbor provisions as
That is, there has been no litigation involving a large video sharing service
provider's qualification for the safe harbor provision until the Veoh cases.
22 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
23 No. 07-5744 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009).
24 See lo Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (holding that video-sharing service provider was not liable for copyright
infringement for having hosted copyrighted videos on its website because it
qualified for the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA); UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-5744 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (holding that the
video-sharing service provider was not liable for copyright infringement for
having hosted videos that contained copyrighted songs because it qualified for
the safe harbor provisions).
452 [VOL. 10: 447
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applied in Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.25 Part IV also briefly
attempts to determine the merits of these arguments and predicts
that the court, if it chooses to follow recent holdings, will find that
YouTube qualifies for the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. In Part
V, this Recent Development argues that finding for YouTube will
correctly balance burdens between service providers and copyright
holders. Placing any additional burden on the video-sharing
service providers, as Viacom suggests, would be inconsistent with
the goals of the DMCA.
II. THE VEOH WEBSITE AND ENSUING LITIGATION
Veoh Networks Inc., operates a website26 where users can view
uploaded videos.27 The videos cover a wide variety of genres,
from homemade comedies to amateur films.28 Veoh dubs its
website the "Internet Television Network."29 Thousands of videos
have been uploaded since the website's launch in February 2006."
The simplicity of the uploading process allows many users to
illegally upload copyrighted contents, including full movies and
TV shows."
25 First Amended Complaint, supra note 14.
26 Veoh, http://www.veoh.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
27 About Us I Veoh: Open. Personalized. Free. TV, http://www.veoh
.com/static/corporate/aboutUs.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).28 Id. ("Veoh gives you free access to all of the great TV and film studio
content, independent productions, and user-generated videos on the Web.").29 Id. The website also states that "Veoh is a revolutionary Internet TV
service that gives viewers the power to easily discover, watch, and personalize
their online viewing experience." Id.
30 ld. ("Currently more than 100,000 publishers-from forward-thinking,
well-known entertainment brands to independent, made-for-the-Web
producers-use Veoh to connect with an audience of more than 24 million
engaged, influential viewers.").
31 To share videos, users must register by submitting their username, email
address and password. See How Do I Begin Broadcasting My Video?,
http://www.veoh.com/static/faq/Uploadingand PublishingVideo/How do_I b
egin broadcasting my video_.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See also UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-5744 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008), 2009 WL
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Consequently, Io Group sued Veoh for copyright infringement
in the Northern District of California.3 2 Jo Group produces,
markets, and distributes adult entertainment products. The
company claimed that Veoh knowingly allowed the sharing of Jo
Group's registered and copyrighted videos.34 Similarly, Universal
Music Group ("UMG"), holders of numerous music copyrights,
sued Veoh for direct, contributory, vicarious and inducement of
copyright infringement in the Central District of California in
2008." In UMG, it was alleged that users had shared and
334022, at *5-7 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 29, 2008). Users may then submit their videos
to the website through the "upload" page where the server automatically makes
a copy, places it on the server indefinitely, converts the video into standardized
format (Flash 7) and extracts metadata from and screenshots of the videos.
Metadata includes file format, movie length, and other information. Several
screenshots of the videos are taken at intermittent periods in the video. When a
user searches for a certain video, the website lists all of the relevant videos that
are found as a result of the search. The server uses these screenshots as preview
pictures for the videos. The website also uses the metadata to show to the user
how long the video is, who the author is, when the movie was actually taken,
and other data. lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
1139-40 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Once the videos are uploaded, the website allows
users to access the videos via "streaming" or by downloading them. See
generally Macromedia Flash-Streaming and File Optimization Techniques for
Flash Player, http://www.adobe.com/support/flash/publishexport/stream_
optimize/stream optimize02.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (discussing how
streaming works). Downloading is possible by the use of a "Veoh Client"
software that the user may download. The user may then "download a copy of
the video file in its original format to their computer hard drive." Jo Group, 586
F. Supp. 2d at 1140. The ease of this process made Veoh a very well-received
website for video sharing. See Danny Allen, Top 10 Video Sharing Sites, PC
WORLD, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/136089/top_10_video_
sharingsites.html (rating Veoh as the 5th best video sharing site, higher than
YouTube's #7 ranking, as well as "very good" in the ease-of-uploading
category) (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
32 lo Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
3 3 Id at 1136
34 lo Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2008). Most of the allegedly infringing videos shared were less than one minute
long. Some, however, were more than twenty minutes in length. Id.
3 UMG, No. 07-5744, at *1. The direct infringement charge refers to where
the service provider itself is providing copyrighted material for the user. The
contributory infringement refer to where the service provider is liable for
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downloaded videos containing UMG copyrighted songs and that
neither Veoh nor its users obtained authorization.36 Veoh argued
that even where infringement was found, it was not liable for
damages because it qualified for the safe harbor defense of the
DMCA."
III. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND ITS USE IN
THE VEOH LITIGATION
A. The DMCA and Its Safe Harbor Provisions
The DMCA was enacted in 1998 in response to the rapid
expansion of the Internet." The Act was created to "to advance
two mutually supportive goals: the protection of intellectual
property rights in today's digital environment and the promotion of
continued growth and development of electronic commerce."39 It
protects copyright owners by creating new circumstances in which
an owner may enforce his or her exclusive rights of reproduction,
public distribution, public performance, and public display.4 0 The
contributing to the occurrence of copyright infringement by, amongst other
requirements, providing a means by which the infringement may occur.
Contributory infringement occurs where a party knows that infringing activity is
taking place and either induces it, causes it, or materially contributes to it.
Vicarious and inducement of copyright infringement refers to where the service
provider has a direct financial interest in the infringing actions being committed
by another (the user) and has the ability to control it, even if the service provider
does not know that the infringement is taking place and does not directly take
part in it. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170-71,
1173 (9th Cir. 2007).
36 UMG, No. 07-5744, at *3.
37 id.
38 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998) (stating one of the purposes of the
DMCA is to "facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of
electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in
the digital age").
39 NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: STUDY EXAMINING 17 USC SECTIONS 109 AND 117
PURSUANT TO SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
(2001), reprinted in THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT: TEXT,
HISTORY, AND CASELAW 457-58 (Christopher Wolf ed., Pike & Fischer 2001).
4 0 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT OF 1998 7 (1998) (allowing copyright owners to sue where another person
SPRING 2009] 455
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DMCA also delineates the safe harbor provisions, codified at 17
U.S.C. § 512. It protects Internet service providers (ISP) by
sheltering them from monetary liability in circumstances in which
they are inadvertently providing access to materials.4 1 Copyright
owners are limited to injunctive relief if the service provider
affirmatively establishes the safe harbor defense.42
In order to gain the protection of any of the safe harbor
provisions, the service provider must first meet the DMCA's
threshold requirements. 43  The provider must show it: (1) had
adopted, reasonably implemented, and informed subscribers of a
policy that enables it to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers
and (2) accommodated and did not interfere with "standard
technical means" used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works."
Under the DMCA, if the service provider meets all of the
threshold requirements, the safe harbor provisions provide
protection from liability in several circumstances.4 5 Particularly,
or company attempts to circumvent the technology that prevents the copyrighted
content from being accessed or copied).
41 To be insulated from liability, an Internet service provider (ISP) must
indiscriminately provide access to both copyrighted and non-copyrighted works;
an ISP cannot provide access only to copyrighted materials. Id. at 8 ("[T]he
DMCA adds a new section 512 to the Copyright Act to create four new
limitations on liability for copyright infringement by online service providers . .
. . Each limitation entails a complete bar on monetary damages, and restricts the
availability of injunctive relief in various respects."). Id. at 8-9.
42 Id. at 9.
43 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006).
4 Id. Further, under the safe harbor provisions, the service provider must
designate an agent "to receive notifications of [copyright infringement
claims] . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Viacom, through its complaint, does not
deny that YouTube has made an agent available to receive copyright
infringement notifications by its admission that YouTube has removed videos in
responses to notices in the past. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 14,
at 28.
45 Under § 512(a), a service provider that has copyrighted materials on its
system is not liable for copyright infringement if such information does not
originate from the provider and is only for transitory purposes. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(a). This primarily protects an ISP or similarly situated party simply acting
as an information conduit. In other words, the provider is free from monetary
liability when it simply forwards information received, such as an email, to the
456 [VOL. 10: 447
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§ 512(c) states that a service provider is not liable for hosting
copyrighted material on its system for a prolonged or even
indefinite amount of time.46 The statute protects websites such as
YouTube and Veoh from liability for copying and retaining
copyrighted videos and songs on their servers, and insulates them
from liability stemming from public distribution and display of the
copyrighted materials. 47  However, to qualify specifically under
§ 512(c), a service provider must show that the storage was at the
direction of a user.48 The service provider must also show: (a) it
does not have actual knowledge of the copyrighted materials and is
not aware of any apparent infringing activities; (b) if it does have
knowledge, it "acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material;" 49 and (c) it does not directly benefit financially from
the infringing activities where it has the right and ability to control
information's ultimate destination. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
Under § 512(b), a service provider is also not liable for copyright
infringement if it keeps copyrighted materials on its server for system caching
purposes. System caching occurs when a service provider retains a copy of
received information in order to more quickly send out the data when there are
multiple requests for the same data. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b). This method expedites
transmissions to users while also reducing server bandwidth and workload.
Where the use of data meets the requirements of the safe harbor provision, a
service provider is not monetarily liable for having such data on its server. 17
U.S.C. § 512(b) (2006).
Under § 512(d), a service provider is free from liability for the acts of
"referring or linking users to [a site that contains] infringing material ... by
using . . . information location tools . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 512(d). This provision
protects search engines and other Internet informational directories from liability
for directing users to copyright infringing content. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
46 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). § 512(c) is the safe harbor provision that Veoh,
YouTube and similarly situated sites rely on. See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2008); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-5744, 2009 WL 334022, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
47 id
48 id
49 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006). If the ISP has knowledge, then this
expeditiousness test comes from 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 17 USC §
512(c)(1)(C) applies the same expeditiousness standard if the ISP has received
notification of infringing material. Id.
SPRING 2009] 457
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such activities."o If the service provider meets all the requirements,
then § 512(c) limits plaintiffs to injunctive relief and forecloses
any monetary relief for direct, vicarious, and contributory
infringement.5 '
B. Use of§ 512(c) in the Veoh Litigation
In both lo Group and UMG, Veoh argued that even in instances
where copyright infringement could be shown, the plaintiffs were
not eligible for monetary relief because Veoh qualified for safe
harbor under § 512(c).52 Veoh claimed that it qualified as a service
provider that stored videos at the request of the user to enable users
to engage in video sharing."
Despite the arguments by lo Group and UMG, both the District
Court for the Central District of California and the District Court
for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of Veoh.54
The courts held that not only did Veoh satisfy the threshold
requirements of safe harbor eligibility, Veoh also satisfied the
specific requirements enumerated under § 512(c)'s safe harbor.5
Thus, Veoh was not subject to monetary liability." These holdings
are consistent with other courts' current interpretations of the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions."
In determining that Veoh satisfied the threshold requirements
50 See id (requiring that internet provider act without actual or apparent
knowledge unless, where they do have knowledge, they act expeditiously to
remove the content). While the DMCA protects service providers for some of
their actions, it does not protect service providers who, in some manner, have
acted in bad faith. A financial benefit as a direct result of infringing activities is
evidence of an intent by the service provider, not just to provide a service, but to
induce infringements so that it may receive financial benefits. Id.
5' Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098-99
(W.D.Wa. 2004).
52 lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-5744, 2009
WL 334022, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008).
53 Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
54 lo Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1155; UMG, No. 07-5744 at *1.
5 Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1145, 1155; UMG, No. 07-5744at *10.
56 No injunctions or any other relief were granted. Id.
5 See infra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
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of the safe harbor provisions, the District Court of Northern
California held that Veoh's policy was reasonably implemented."
Thus, Veoh did not have a duty to take action beyond deleting
accounts of repeat offenders.59 In coming to its conclusion, the
court applied a "reasonable implementation" standard developed
by the Ninth Circuit's Court of Appeals and district courts."o Other
courts have similarly found that a service provider has no duty to
"affirmatively police users for evidence of repeat infringement."
1. Storage at the Direction of the User
The Jo Group and UMG courts both held that Veoh's system of
converting and copying the uploaded videos was storage at the
direction of the user.6' Although the users do not require the
videos be converted and copied, the courts held that this process is
at the direction of the user.' This is consistent with the only other
case that has dealt with the issue, Costar Group v. Loopnet.63 The
court in Costar found that photos were stored at the direction of the
user even though the defendant's employees individually examined
and approved each photo before posting them on the defendant's
58 Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-1145.
59 d.
60 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBilI LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting further that § 512(c) expressly lists when a provider has a duty to
terminate an account; a repeat offense is not grounds for termination). The Io
Group court also cited Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090
(W.D.Wa. 2004), a decision by the District Court of Western Washington. The
Corbis court held that the standard is "reasonable" policy, not "perfect" policy.
See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wa.
2004). The "mere fact that [the repeat infringer] . . . appeared on [the
defendant's website] . . . under a different user name and identity does not, by
itself, create a legitimate question of fact regarding the procedural
implementation of [the defendant's] . . . termination policy." Id.
61 Jo Group at 1148. As long as the process is automatic in some manner, the
actions are still at the direction of the user. See id. (holding that the service
provider's process was at the direction of the user where it "pre-selects the
software parameters for the process from a range of default values set by the
third-party software ... [and] does not itself actively participate or supervise the
uploading of the files . . . [n]or does it preview or select the files before the
upload .....
62 Id.
63 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
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website because it was "not . .. a . .. selection process, but . . . a
mere screening."' Furthermore, although Veoh goes beyond
storage by duplicating, distributing, and displaying the videos,
conformation to the DMCA's goal to protect providers who allow
users to share media requires shielding Veoh from liability.65
2. Knowledge
The Io Group court also held that Veoh had neither actual nor
apparent knowledge of copyright infringement. 6 It further held
that Veoh did not have actual knowledge because it had not
received any notices of infringing activity.6 ' This is consistent
with the text of the DMCA, which states that where notices are not
delivered to the service provider, the notices cannot impute actual
knowledge.68 Similarly, the Io Group court held that even though
some of the shared videos were trademarked, Veoh did not have
apparent knowledge because there was no actual evidence "from
which it [could] . . . be inferred that Veoh was aware of, but chose
to ignore [the trademarks] . . ."69 This is consistent with Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill, the only other case where the court interpreted
the requirements of "apparent knowledge."o In Perfect 10, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to place the burden
of detecting whether an uploaded photograph is illegal on the
service provider." The court stated that even a logo appearing in a
MId. at 702.
6s UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 07-5744, 2009 WL
334022, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008).
66 lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp.2d 1132, 1148-1149
(N.D. Cal. 2008).6 1Id. at 1148.
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
69 Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. While the plaintiff made a similar
argument that Veoh had "apparent knowledge" of copyrighted material, there
were no arguments involving "tags or description terms" of copyrighted
materials. Id.
70 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).
71 Id. at 1114 ("When a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by
nature, describing photographs as 'illegal' or 'stolen' may be an attempt to
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are
actually illegal or stolen. We do not place the burden of determining whether
photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.").
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video is not enough to impute apparent knowledge on the service
provider.7 2
3. Financial Benefits and Control
The Io Group court finally held that although Veoh received
financial benefits attributable to the infringing activity by having
received profits from advertisements, it still met the specific
requirements of § 512(c) because it did not have the requisite
"control" over the infringing activities." The Io Group court
stated that the ability of a service provider to block or remove
access to material stored on its website does not equate to a right
and ability to control all infringing activity.74 Furthermore, the
court stated that such a holding would be incompatible with the
goals of the DMCA." The Io Group holding conforms with prior
decisions concerning the "right and ability to control" the
infringing activity.76 The Central District Court of California, for
72 Satirical videos, in some cases, have been seen as fair use. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (deciding the issue of whether 2
Live Crew's commercial parody of the song "Oh Pretty Woman" may be fair
use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976).
7 lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150-1155
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
7 4 id.
7 Id; see also Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1109
(W.D. Wash. 2004). Similarly, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the service
provider's right and ability to control infringing activity was limited to
disconnecting the webmaster's access to Internet Key's services. The court held
that this type of control is not sufficient under the DMCA to show "right and
ability to control" the infringing activity and that "closing the safe harbor based
on the mere ability to exclude users from the system is inconsistent with the
statutory scheme." 488 F.3d 1102, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007).
76 See Tur v. YouTube. No.06-4436, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 1893635, at *3
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding defendant, internet provider, did not have the requisite
control even though it maintained its website because it did not have the
technical ability to detect and prescreen infringing material); MGM, Inc. v.
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005) (finding defendant, music sharing service
provider, had the ability to block users and had rejected other companies' offers
to help monitor its servers for infringing materials); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir.1996) (holding a swap meet proprietor
liable for third party's record sale at swap meet because sufficient elements of
control were present when the defendant had the right to terminate vendors, had
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example, held that the requirement "presupposes some antecedent
ability to limit or filter copyrighted material."" The Ninth Circuit,
similarly, found that the right and ability to control infringing
activity "has been held to mean 'something more' than just the
ability of a service provider to remove or block access to material
posted on its website."7 ' Thus, the Jo Group holding is consistent
with courts' prior applications of the "right and ability" to control
the infringing activity. These holdings were consistent with the
few cases, thus far, that have tested the DMCA's safe harbor
provisions.
Though not controlling in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, these holdings may nonetheless forecast a
similar result in Viacom v. YouTube. The similarities between
YouTube's and Veoh's services and the parallels between
Viacom's, lo Group's, and UMG's arguments may be sufficiently
analogous for the Viacom court to adopt a holding in favor of
YouTube.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE YOUTUBE WEBSITE AND THE VIACOM
LITIGATION
YouTube's website and the services it provides are almost
identical to that of Veoh's. 79 Like Veoh, YouTube is a website that
allows users to upload and share a wide range of videos. 0 Like
Veoh, when a user uploads a video, YouTube copies the video,
converts it to its own video format, adds the video to its server, and
the ability to promote the swap meet, and could control customer access); A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. eBay, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir.2001)
(holding that "[t]he ability to block infringers' access to a particular
environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to
supervise").
77 Tur v. YouTube, Inc. No.06-4436, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 1893635, at *3
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (referencing MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 926
(2005)).
78 Id.
79 See supra note 27; infra note 80.
so See YouTube Company History, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last
visited Feb. 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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makes it available for public or private viewing."' YouTube then
transmits the video by sending streaming data to the user.8 2 Like
Veoh, YouTube's users may share videos by sending a link to the
video through email or Facebook.83 Users may also embed the
video on their website by using the "share" feature.84
In its Terms of Use, YouTube, like Veoh, retains the right to
take down videos that users upload online." YouTube also
reserves the right to terminate and ban any users who are repeat
offenders." Additionally, both Veoh's and YouTube's websites
provide users and content providers with the ability to notify the
service provider of potentially infringing videos." The primary
81 First Amended Complaint at 4, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. No. 07-
2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2008 filed Apr. 24, 2008). Data and screenshots of the videos
are also taken from the uploaded video in order to enhance the search results.
Id. at 11.
82 id
83 Id. at 12-13.
84 id.
85 See YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube com/t/terms (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Every user who uploads a video must agree to the Terms of Use before
uploading a video to the site. Id. Also, every time a user submits a video,
YouTube warns: "Do not upload any TV shows, music videos, music concerts,
or commercials without permission . . . ." YouTube Video File Upload,
http://www.youtube.com/myvideosupload (last visited Jan 27, 2009) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
86 See YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube .com/t/terms (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
("YouTube will terminate a User's access to its Website if, under appropriate
circumstances, they are determined to be a repeat infringer.").
87 YouTube Glossary: Flag As Inappropriate, http://www.google.com/
support/youtube/bin/answer.py? hl=en&answer-95403 (last visited Jan. 27,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). On
every page in which a video is shown, the user has the ability to "flag" a video if
he or she thinks it may be infringing on a copyright. Id. Copyright owners may
also file with YouTube a DMCA complaint notification of infringing videos.
See YouTube Terms of Use (stating that "if you are a copyright owner or an
agent thereof and believe that any User Submission or other content infringes
upon your copyrights, you may submit a notification pursuant to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act"). When YouTube receives notice that a user has
uploaded infringing content, it gives the user a warning. Id. If another
notification is filed, YouTube terminates the account, bans the email address,
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difference between the two providers is that YouTube's
capabilities are limited to online sharing, while Veoh allows users
to view videos offline.88
In March 2008, Viacom and its affiliates, the owners of
thousands of copyrighted materials, including popular TV shows
such as The Daily Show and South Park, sued YouTube for
copyright infringement.89 Viacom alleged that YouTube
committed direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement.o In response, YouTube denied all allegations of
infringement and argued that its conduct fell within the safe harbor
provisions of the DMCA.9 1
Before holdings in Io Group and UMG, the viability of
YouTube's defense was unclear. With these recent holdings,
however, YouTube's success is more certain. Although the Veoh
cases were heard in a different federal circuit, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York should consider the similarities
between Veoh and YouTube and find the arguments made in favor
of the safe harbor defense persuasive.92 The Veoh decisions'
conclusions of law, which are consistent with prior applications of
the DMCA, may also be convincing. If the court chooses to follow
these recent developments that lend favorable precedent on the
side of a similarly situated video-sharing website, it should find
YouTube free from liability through the safe harbor provision
codified at § 512(c).
V. YOUTUBE'S LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
YouTube must satisfy the threshold requirements in order to
affirmatively present the safe harbor defense. The threshold
and disables all of the content provided by that user. Id. ("If you are a copyright
owner or an agent thereof and believe that any User Submission or other content
infringes upon your copyrights, you may submit a notification pursuant to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.").
88 See Jo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139
(N.D. Cal. 2008);
89 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 14.
90 Id. at 22-29.
9' Id. at 8-10.
92 Id. at 10.
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requires that YouTube reasonably implement plans to terminate the
account of repeat offenders and not take steps to hinder a copyright
owner's "standard technical means" of identifying copyright
infringement.
A. Threshold Requirements for Safe Harbor Provisions
1. "Reasonable implementation" of Repeat Offender Account
Termination
Because of the similarities in YouTube's and Veoh's policies
and Terms of Use, the Viacom court should find that YouTube's
policy was also "reasonably implemented."" Essentially, because
Veoh and YouTube both reserve the option to terminate repeat
offenders, the reasonable implementation threshold is established.
Furthermore, both Veoh and YouTube take affirmative steps to
notify users if they provide infringing materials to the site.
2. Interference with "Standard Technical Means"
Further, YouTube can show that it has not interfered with the
standard technical means used by copyright owners to identify
copyrighted work on its websites, despite Viacom's arguments that
YouTube interfered by limiting search results to 1,000 videos and
preventing copyright owners from searching privately-shared
9 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145
(N.D. Cal. 2008). Veoh also alleged in its complaint:
YouTube does not even try to block slightly altered copies of the very
same video from being uploaded again immediately after being
removed . . . [a]nd it removes only the specific infringing clips at the
specific web addresses (URLs) identified in a takedown notice, rather
than all infringing works that can be reasonably located using the
representative lists and other information in the notice.
First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 16. This argument, however, does
not disqualify YouTube from safe harbor because § 512(i) only requires that
there is a reasonable policy of removing repeat offenders. Even assuming that it
is required, the standard is only that of reasonableness. Given the size of
YouTube's video library and also the number of videos uploaded per day, it can
be argued that it would be unreasonable to require YouTube to find all of the
"similar videos" that may be infringing. Such requirements would place too
much burden on the service provider who does not know as well as the
copyright owner what content they actually own. This is discussed infra, Part V.
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videos.94 Internet users cannot retrieve more than 1,000 results
from a search engine; this result limitation is an industry
standard.95 Requiring service providers to produce more would
impose substantial costs on them and burden their networks.9 6
Likewise, there is no consensus that copyright owners have the
right to look at privately-shared videos. In fact, in response to
Viacom's motion to compel, the Viacom court found that there was
"no sufficiently compelling need" for Viacom to have access to
these privately shared videos.9 7 Thus, the court is unlikely to find
that these two abilities are standard technical means, to which all
copyright owners are entitled. Therefore, YouTube's refusal to
share privately shared videos and its limitation on search results do
not violate Viacom's standard technical means to identify
infringing materials. The court should, therefore, find that
YouTube satisfies the threshold requirements of the safe harbor
provisions by reasonably implementing methods to terminate
repeat offender user accounts and by not hindering Viacom's
identification of copyright infringing materials.
94 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 17 ("YouTube is
deliberately interfering with copyright owners' ability to find infringing videos
even after they are added to YouTube's library. YouTube offers a feature that
allows users to designate 'friends' who are the only persons allowed to see
videos they upload, preventing copyright owners from finding infringing videos
with this limitation. YouTube has also recently limited the search function so
that it identifies no more than 1,000 video clips for any given search.").
95 Yahoo, Google, Excite and Altavista are currently the predominant search
engines used on the Internet. Each of these sites has implemented a 1,000
search result maximum policy. Regardless of what the search term is, each
search engine limits the results to 1,000 entries, even where there may be more.
See Advanced Search Tips: Viewing more results, http://www.google.com
/support/websearch/bin/answer.py?answer-484 (last visited Jan 27, 2009) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Search Engine Size
Test: July 2000, http://searchenginewatch.com/2162821 (last visited Jan 27,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
96 Millions and Millions of Search Results ... Ignored, http://louisgray.com/
live/2007/12/millions-and-millions-of-search-results.html (quoting Google's
statement that "[i]t would heavily tax our system to provide these results for
everyone.") (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology). Google, for example, states that returning more than
1,000 results would impose a substantial burden on their servers. Id.
97 Id.
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B. Specific Requirements off 512(c)98
To be eligible for safe harbor protection, YouTube must also
satisfy the specific requirements enumerated under § 512(c). In
order to do so, YouTube must establish that the online storage
occurs at the direction of the user and that the company does not
have actual knowledge of infringement, responds expeditiously to
DMCA take-down requests, and lacks financial benefits and
control over the copyright infringement.99
1. Storage at the Direction of the User'oo
As seen from the holdings in Io Group and UMG, the court is
likely to find that YouTube's actions are storage at the direction of
the user. Like Veoh, each time a user uploads a video, all of the
functions and data in the conversion process are predetermined and
automatically executed without human intervention.'O1 As the
UMG court interpreted § 512(c), "storage" is not limited to merely
holding the material in an online database but can include showing
the video, converting the video format, or allowing users to
download the video.'O2 Thus, YouTube also offers a service that
provides storage at the direction of the user.
2. Knowledge
According to Jo Group, if a service provider receives DMCA
takedown notices, then the service provider is deemed to have
actual knowledge of the existence of a specific copyright-
98 As it stores and is the source of potentially infringing videos, YouTube does
not qualify for three of the four safe harbor provisions: § 512(a) (transitory
digital network communications), § 512(b) (system caching), or § 512(d)
(information location tools). See First Amended Complaint, supra note 14.
99 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
100 First, Viacom alleges that YouTube converts and copies videos at its own
direction, not that of the user. First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 11. It
also argues that YouTube's actions are beyond that of "storage." Id.
o'0 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. If YouTube were to
individually determine whether a video was to be picked, an uploaded video
would not, in that case, be at the direction of a user. It is still at the direction of
the user where a service provider manually checks the content and converts the
video if it is to check whether a video is copyrighted. Costar Group, Inc. v.
Lognet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702 (D. Md. 2001).
102 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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infringing video.' Because YouTube has received and complied
with many takedown notices from Viacom, it is likely the court
will find that YouTube has actual knowledge of specific copyright-
infringing videos." If a service provider does not expeditiously
remove the infringing material of which it has actual knowledge,
the service provider loses the safe harbor defense available under
the DMCA."35
Where a notice provides insufficient detail, however, courts
may refuse to impose a duty on the service provider to remove
similar infringing materials not explicitly listed.' 6 Some courts
have read the notice requirement strictly. For example, the court in
Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc.'o7 held that a notice was
insufficient where the copyright owner only listed artists and failed
to include references to the material claimed to be infringing by,
such as, highlighting links to website pages.'0o As a result, the
court did not impose a duty on the service provider to find all
103 Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148; see Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wa. 2004) ("The notice of infringement
constitutes evidence of the service provider's knowledge."); cf Perfect 10, Inc.
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Since Perfect 10 did not
provide effective notice, knowledge of infringement may not be imputed to
CCBill or CWIE based on Perfect 10's communications.").
1 See, e.g., Posting of Eric Bangeman to Ars Technica, http://arstechnica
.com/tech-policy/news/2007/04/viacom-we-goofed-on-colbert-parody-takedown
-notice-case-dismissed.ars (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'0o 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). Viacom alleges that YouTube did
not act expeditiously by failing to remove all similar videos on its website and to
ensure that no previously removed video is re-uploaded. First Amended
Complaint, supra note 14, at 17 ("[YouTube] remove[d] only the specific
infringing clips at the specific web addresses (URLs) identified in a takedown
notice, rather than all infringing works that can be reasonably located using the
representative lists and other information in the notice.").
106 No. 00 Civ. 4660 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
2002).
I07 id.
108 Id. at *25-26. That court held that a notice is sufficient only when it goes
beyond simply naming particular artists and songs, such as by highlighting links
to website pages which the copyright owners believed led to copyright
infringing material. Id.
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infringing materials by the same artist.'O9
In YouTube's case, it is likely the court will conclude that
YouTube had no duty to find all other "works that can be
reasonably located using . . . [Viacom's] notice.""' Viacom's
notices do not explicitly describe locations where the other
infringing videos can be found and do not give clear notice to
YouTube that a video is infringing."' These notices are too broad
and should not trigger a duty on the part of YouTube to search its
entire website."2 Furthermore, the efforts required to compare
side-by-side all videos contained on the website are unrealistically
high for a service provider, while relatively low for copyright
owners, especially where there are many files located on the
website."' Even where it is feasible,"4 "there is no assurance that
109 Id. at *30. The court also did not impose a duty to identify infringing
works that are uploaded in the future. Id. Similarly, the court in ALS Scan, Inc.
v. Remarq Communities, Inc. found that notice imposed a duty only when it
explicitly listed links to "two sites created for the sole purpose of publishing [the
plaintiff s] copyrighted works." 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
110 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 17.
.i See Id. at 16-17 (admitting that the notices indicate the infringing videos
but then demand that YouTube remove all the videos that can be reasonably
located). It only directs YouTube to the allegedly infringing video. Id.
112 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th
Cir. 2001). Unlike ALS Scan, in which the two referenced websites only
contained copyright infringing material, Viacom's DMCA notice pointing to
"YouTube website" is a general listing of a website that contains both non-
infringing and allegedly infringing videos. Id.
113 The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Costar Group found that there is a
duty to ensure that a similar copyright is not re-uploaded in the future. 373 F.3d
544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004). The court found that, where a notice is given to
remove one specific infringing photo, the service provider is imputed to have
knowledge and such a duty is imposed. The service provider in Costar met this
duty to act expeditiously when it manually conducted a "side-by-side review
between the known infringing photo with all other future uploaded photos. In Io
Group, the court stated that where there are many files located on the website,
"no reasonable juror could conclude that a comprehensive review of every file
would be feasible." Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008). A manual side-by-side comparison with the
200,000 videos uploaded per day on YouTube's website is, in itself, practically
impossible. See Posting of Michael Wesch to Digital Ethnography @ Kansas
State University, http://mediatedcultures.net/ksudigg/?p=163 (Mar. 18, 2008)
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[a video sharing service provider] could accurately identify] the
infringing content in question" because it is the copyright owner
and not the service provider who has better knowledge of the
copyright and its details."'
Even if YouTube had actual knowledge of the infringing
material, the Viacom court will likely find that YouTube is not
disqualified from the safe harbor provision of § 512(c) because
they acted expeditiously to remove all videos explicitly listed in
Viacom's takedown notices. If the court strictly scrutinizes the
takedown notice, as expected, it will likely find that YouTube had
no duty to remove similar videos without more exacting
notification from Viacom. Under the DMCA and the takedown
notice requirements, Viacom has the duty to find copyright
infringing videos on YouTube and to provide YouTube with the
address (URL) to the infringing videos. Unless YouTube fails to
expeditiously remove the infringing video, YouTube can
successfully assert the safe harbor defense.
3. Financial Benefits and Control
While it is undisputed that YouTube received financial benefits
from advertising revenue,"' YouTube would not be disqualified
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (estimating over
150,000 videos uploaded per day).
114 The plaintiff even concedes in its complaint that YouTube does have some
tools available to fight this problem. See First Amended Complaint, supra note
14, at 16 ("Although YouTube touts the availability of purported copyright
protection tools on its site, at best these tools help copyright owners find a
portion of the infringing files, and, as to that portion, only after the files have
been uploaded. These tools also prevent upload of the exact same video (or the
exact same excerpt of a video) after YouTube receives a takedown notice from
the owner.").
" Jo Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. See also Arista Records, Inc. v.
MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002). The Northern District Court of California in
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., stated that
"where a service operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of infringement due
to the copyright holder's failure to provide the necessary documentation to show
there is a likely infringement, the operator's lack of knowledge is reasonable and
there is no liability." 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
116 Yinka Adegoke, YouTube to Sell Music, Games in Revenue Push,
REUTERS UK, http://uk.reuters.conarticle/technology-media-telco-SP/idUKN
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from the safe harbor provision of § 512(c) if it did not have the
requisite control over the infringing activities.'17  Because
YouTube's ability to control the infringing activity is limited to the
ability to block or remove access to materials stored on its website,
a court following Veoh will likely find that YouTube also lacked
the necessary control."' Thus, because Veoh and YouTube offer
similar services and undertook similar actions, the Viacom court
may be persuaded to find that YouTube satisfies all of the
requirements of the safe harbor provisions of § 512(c) and is
therefore free from monetary liability.
VI. ENFORCING THE GOALS OF THE DMCA
Congress enacted the DMCA "to facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the
digital age."ll9 The Act's goal is to balance the interests of three
essential groups: creators, users, and facilitators of content.120 In
other words, it is important that the interdependent interests of the
0748166220081007, Oct. 7, 2008. Viacom argues that YouTube does not meet
the requirements for the safe harbor provisions of § 512(c) because it received a
financial benefit directly attributable to such activity. See First Amended
Complaint, supra note 14, at 14 ("Defendants profit handsomely from the
infringement of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works, and receive financial benefits
directly attributable to the infringing activity.").
" See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006). Viacom argues that YouTube had
sufficient control because it had the power to remove any video. See First
Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 10-11, 15 ("Though the videos available
on YouTube are uploaded by users in the first instance, upon upload the videos
become part of the YouTube library for performance and display on YouTube's
own website, which Defendants control and directly profit from . . . . YouTube
has the right and ability to control the massive infringement on its site ....
Through its Terms of Use, YouTube imposes a wide number of content-based
restrictions on the types of videos uploaded to the site, and reserves and
exercises the unfettered right to block or remove any video which, in its sole
discretion, it deems 'inappropriate.' ").
118 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
119 See Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (quoting the Senate Judiciary
Report, 105-190, at 1-2). See also Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2006)).
120 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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copyright owner, the end user, and the service provider are
protected in order to achieve the copyright law's overall purpose of
facilitating creative innovation. If one group is not sufficiently
protected, the others will ultimately suffer harm.
Because of the ever-changing nature of technology and the
Internet, DMCA's effectiveness is unclear. Specifically, the
DMCA's ability to balance the interests and burdens of content
creators, users, and facilitators has been uncertain, especially in
light of emerging methods of creating, sharing, and using
information 2 ' such as videos sharing.'2 2 With the holdings of Io
Group and UMG, however, the federal courts are clarifying the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions. These recent decisions are part
of a growing movement to expand the DMCA's power to protect
service providers like Veoh. As a result, it is more likely that a
service provider will satisfy the safe harbor provisions in the face
of challenges to its safe harbor eligibility. This is congruent with
the recent broadening of protection for service providers beyond
the video-sharing industry and even beyond § 512(c). For
example, one court found Google was not liable where a search
engine service provider had copied, stored, and published
thumbnail images of copyrighted photos in its search results.123
This is just one of many such results in which the courts have
protected service providers. The court in Viacom v. YouTube
should follow this recent trend in the law and uphold the goals of
the DMCA by finding that YouTube's circumstances satisfy the
safe harbor provisions.
The court would rightly place the burden of protection on those
who own the copyright by ruling for YouTube. Instead of shifting
121 Cf U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 9. The U.S. Constitution, the source of
congressional power in creating patent and copyrights, states that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
122 Video-sharing services not only induce sharing among users but also
induce the creation and usage of such information because of the increased ease
at which videos can be found and the increased speed at which a video can
become popular.
123 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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the burden of protection almost entirely to the service provider, the
legal duty should be placed on the owner of the copyright. The
owners are in the best position to know the intricate details of what
is protected and can most accurately determine when another's
product is infringing their copyright. At the same time, the court
should balance this burden by creating, but limiting, liability of a
service provider only when it is no longer acting innocently.
Especially in recent times, courts have rejected putting additional
burdens on service providers.'2 4 Placing the burden on the service
provider could create an enormous disincentive for service
providers to offer access to their services, since each could be
targeted for copyright infringement.
Balancing the burden in this way would benefit all three
groups-content providers, users, and facilitators-and would
support the DMCA's goal of fostering innovation. Copyright
owners have the incentive to create new works because they have
much to gain financially. Along with receiving revenue through
their traditional means, video-sharing service providers allow
copyright owners to spread their copyrights even further and
maximize their profits. Word of mouth promotional
communication between users is an efficient method of creating
chatter to popularize content owners' copyrights 25 and ultimately
to increase the owners' profits.'26 Users who see videos and clips
on YouTube are more likely to visit the original source than those
who have not seen them. Also, as seen from recent contracts
between YouTube and some content providers, the copyright
owners can benefit financially in a way they otherwise could not
124 Courts have rejected putting a burden on service providers based on merely
imputed knowledge. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113
(9th Cir. 2007) ("Permitting a copyright holder to cobble together adequate
notice from separately defective notices also unduly burdens service
providers.").
125 The trademark used in the videos may also become popular along with the
copyright.
126 Greater chatter may increase the sales of the video (for example DVDs).
Further, as it becomes more popular, the demand for the video may increase and
the demand for licenses to use the videos may also increase as a result.
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by licensing to content providers. 2 7 Along with benefitting the
end-users by maximizing the number of channels to reap the
benefits of art and innovation, balancing the burden also induces
innovation. Users have more access to content that they can use as
inspiration to create their own innovative and artistic products.
Finally, by creating the means through which users and copyright
owners may cooperate, service providers benefit financially
through several business models including advertisements and
licensing. Thus, by ruling for YouTube, the court would be
protecting the interests of the copyright owners, service providers
and end-users-the three groups essential to innovation-by
correctly balancing the burden of copyright protection.
Consequently, the court would be supporting the goals of the
DMCA and following the recent trend of case law.
VII. CONCLUSION
YouTube's website and the services it provides are almost
identical to those of Veoh. The two companies provide similar
websites where users upload, view, and share videos. However,
the ease with which such sharing is accomplished has aided users
in illegally uploading copyrighted movies. As a result, copyright
owners have sued the websites, alleging copyright infringement.
Both companies asserted the affirmative defense of DMCA's safe
harbor provisions. These provisions protect service providers from
monetary damages where they have met the threshold requirements
for all safe harbors and the specific requirements for at least one of
the safe harbors. In examining whether Veoh is liable for
copyright infringement, the District Courts for California found
that Veoh qualified for the safe harbor provisions. As a result,
only an injunctive remedy was available for the copyright owners.
While the decisions of the California courts are not controlling,
their reasoning, along with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
Courts, provides persuasive evidence that YouTube meets the
127 See Miguel Helft, YouTube and Universal Music Are Said to Discuss Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009
/03/05/technology/intemet/05music.html (reporting that YouTube has been in
deals with Amazon and other companies, including Universal Music).
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burden of § 512(c)'s safe harbor affirmative defense. A holding in
favor of YouTube furthers the goals of the DMCA by protecting
the rights of copyright holders, service providers, and end users.
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